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The Eleventh Circuit’s Second Shot at Getting It Right:
Nonconsensual Nondebtor Releases in Bankruptcy Court
Pierce G. Hand, IV*

INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals encountered the issue of nonconsensual nondebtor releases in Chapter 11 bankruptcy
seemingly for the first time in In re Munford, Inc.1 Nonconsensual
nondebtor releases2 are provisions within a reorganization plan confirmed by the court that operate to “enjoin a non-consenting party
who has participated fully in . . . bankruptcy proceedings but who has
objected to the non-debtor release barring it from making claims
against the non-debtor that would undermine the operations of the
reorganized entity.”3 These provisions essentially operate to give a
nondebtor, a person or entity that has not filed for bankruptcy, the
protection of bankruptcy laws by releasing the nondebtor from future
claims by creditors in order to ensure the success of an actual debtor
in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In Munford, the Eleventh Circuit held that
11 U.S.C. § 105(a)(3) gave bankruptcy courts authority to issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry
out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including such nondebtor
releases.4
Before Munford, the District of Columbia and First Circuit Courts
of Appeals reached similar decisions, while the Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals held that bankruptcy courts lack this authority
under the reasoning that 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) permitted the release of
* J.D., Georgia State University College of Law. The author is a practicing attorney in the
field of commercial litigation at the international law firm of Bryan Cave LLP in Atlanta, GA.
He would like to thank Jack F. Williams, Ph.D., J.D., for his insight on Chapter 11 bankruptcy
that ultimately made this Article possible.
1. Munford v. Munford (In re Munford, Inc.), 97 F.3d 449 (11th Cir. 1996).
2. The Eleventh Circuit also refers to “nondebtor releases” as “bar orders.” SE Prop. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc.), 780 F.3d
1070, 1076 n.2 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Vision-Park Properties, L.L.C. v. Seaside
Eng’g & Surveying, L.L.C., 136 S. Ct. 109 (2015) (“Previous decisions of this Circuit have referred to non-debtor releases as ‘bar orders.’ ”).
3. Id. at 1077.
4. In re Munford, Inc., 97 F.3d at 455.
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only the debtor, not co-liable third parties.5 After Munford, only the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, while a majority of circuit courts (the Second, Third, Fourth,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals) sided with the Eleventh
Circuit’s holding in Munford.6
While the United States Supreme Court has yet to resolve this circuit split, the Eleventh Circuit recently encountered the issue of
nondebtor releases again in In re Seaside Engineering & Surveying,
Inc. under a different set of facts.7 The Eleventh Circuit could have
taken this opportunity to arrive at a different holding in light of the
minority circuit courts’ decisions. However, it chose to remain with
the majority of circuit courts and uphold its initial ruling—although
using different reasoning—that bankruptcy courts have authority to
issue nondebtor releases.8 Is there merit to the minority circuit courts’
reasonings and decisions? What reasoning by sister circuits did the
Eleventh Circuit consider in reaching its decision? Most importantly,
did the Eleventh Circuit apply the most appropriate standards and
reach an outcome that the United States Supreme Court should
adopt?
In answering these questions through analysis of the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision, this Article argues that the United States Supreme Court should adopt a plain reading of § 105(a) that permits
bankruptcy courts to issue temporary nonconsensual nondebtor releases. By addressing this issue, the Supreme Court would resolve a
multi-circuit split and prevent creditors’ claims from being permanently barred while still providing protection to the debtor’s reorganization process. Part I of this Article reviews the pertinent language of
§ 105(a) and § 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code and provides a historical account of the case law development on nondebtor releases from
5. See Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1995);
Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995); In re W. Real Estate Fund
Inc., 922 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1990), modified sub nom. Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir.
1991)); In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Eric W. Anderson & Jay
Basham, Please Release Me, Let Me Go: Eleventh Circuit Embraces Third-Party Release Standards, 34-6 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (2015).
6. See Behrmann v. Nat’l Heritage Found., Inc., 663 F.3d 704 (4th Cir. 2011); Bank of N.Y. Tr.
Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.
2009); In re Ingersoll, Inc., 562 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009); Airadigm Commc’ns., Inc. v. FCC (In re
Airadigm Commc’ns., Inc.), 519 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2008); Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch v.
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136 (2d Cir.
2005); Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648
(6th Cir. 2002); Gillman v. Cont’l Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 205 (3d Cir.
2000).
7. In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc., 780 F.3d at 1074.
8. Id. at 1076-77.
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pre-Munford to Seaside.9 Part II analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s recent approach and holding in Seaside within the context of the different approaches and holdings reached by the majority and minority of
circuit courts.10 Part III proposes that the United States Supreme
Court adopt the Seventh Circuit’s approach in reasoning that bankruptcy courts have equitable authority to issue nondebtor releases,
adopt the Sixth Circuit’s seven-factor test to ensure such releases are
only issued within the boundaries of the Bankruptcy Code, and make
the nondebtor releases temporary and inclusive of all claims against
nondebtors.11
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Bankruptcy Code: Sections 105(a) and 524(e)

Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides in relevant part:
“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”12 In reaching
the conclusion that bankruptcy courts have authority to issue
nondebtor releases under the Code, § 105(a) is often read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, which is incorporated in
adversary proceedings under Bankruptcy Rule 7016.13 Bankruptcy
Rule 7016 states in pertinent part: “At any [settlement] conference,
the court may consider and take appropriate action on . . . settling the
case and using special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute
when authorized by statute or local rule.”14
Section 524(e) provides in relevant part, “discharge of a debt of the
debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.”15 This provision has been
used by circuit courts to contradict the notion that § 105(a) permits
the release of nondebtor liability and support the notion that it only
permits release of debt belonging to the debtor.16 However, a prior
version of this statute, repealed in 1979, provided “[t]he liability of a
person who is a co-debtor with, or guarantor or in any manner a
surety for, a bankrupt shall not be altered by the discharge of such
9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
13. Id.
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(I); see, e.g., Munford v. Munford (In re Munford, Inc.), 97 F.3d
449, 454-55 (11th Cir. 1996).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012).
16. E.g., Bank of N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber
Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 251-52 (5th Cir. 2009).
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bankrupt.”17 This repealed language raises implications about
whether drafters of the Code went from being staunchly against altering debt of nondebtors to possibly open to the idea under unique
circumstances.
B.
1.

The Case Law

Pre-Munford Case Law Development

Likely one of the first circuits to address the issue, the District of
Columbia (D.C.) Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on nondebtor releases in 1986 in In re AOV Indus., Inc.18 This case involved alleged
violations of § 524(e) due to the confirmation of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan of a debtor company engaged in coal mining, processing, exporting, and trading companies.19 The reorganization plan
included two creditors renouncing over $51 million in claims and
agreeing to contribute over $4.5 million to satisfy the outstanding
claims against the debtor.20 In addition to receiving all of the debtor’s
stock and a $2.6 million security interest in the debtor’s assets, the
creditors also required the unsecured creditors of the debtor to release all of their pending claims21 against the creditors if the creditors
made “a total of $3 million of the $4.5 million fund available to the
unsecured creditors.”22 The D.C. Circuit found that this “on its face
was entirely reasonable” and reasoned that the creditors “could not
have been expected to commit millions of dollars to a reorganization
plan and still remain liable to individual creditors for the full amount
of their claims.”23
Years later in 1990 and 1995, the Tenth Circuit and Ninth Circuit,
respectively, reached opposite conclusions and found nondebtor releases impermissible. In In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc., an attorney’s
proof of claim for attorney’s fees from services rendered under a prepetition contract with the debtor was enjoined from collecting the re17. Airadigm Commc’ns., Inc. v. FCC (In re Airadigm Commc’ns., Inc.), 519 F.3d 640, 656
(7th Cir. 2008) (quoting the repealed statute) (emphasis added).
18. In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
19. Id. at 1142.
20. Id. at 1143.
21. Derivative claims totaling $25 million had been brought against one of the creditors by the
debtor and intervenors, the Creditors’ Committee, alleging “that an agency or joint-venture relationship existed between [the debtor] and [the creditor], and plaintiffs sought the nullification of
transfers to [the creditor] as well as contract and tort damages.” Id. at 1152.
22. Id. at 1143.
23. Id. at 1152.
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mainder of the claimed fee from a third party in state court.24 The
Tenth Circuit found that the bankruptcy court had relied on its broad
equitable power under § 105(a)25 and found that a temporary injunction was “warranted during pendency of [the] bankruptcy proceeding”
concerning funds from the third-party that were subject to indemnification by the debtor. This limited temporary stay would serve to
“protect [the debtor] during preparation and confirmation of a reorganization plan.”26
The Tenth Circuit further held, however, that a permanent injunction that continued after post-confirmation of the plan, in essence, discharged the third-party’s liability for unpaid portions of the attorney’s
fees and was improper.27 The court reasoned that § 524(a) was a
broad “fresh start” injunctive provision for the debtor who has “invoked and submitted to the bankruptcy process;” the court observed,
“Congress did not intend to extend such benefits to third-party bystanders.”28 Most importantly, the court emphasized that the specific
provisions of § 1141(d)(1)(A), which provides that “the confirmation
of a plan . . . discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the
date of such confirmation,” and § 524(e), which provides that a discharge “does not affect the liability of any other entity,” are significant to the use of § 105(a), “since a bankruptcy court’s supplementary
equitable powers thereunder may not be exercised in a manner that is
inconsistent with the other, more specific provisions of the Code.”29
In the end, the Tenth Circuit held that the stay could not be extended
post-confirmation as a permanent injunction.30
The Ninth Circuit, in In re Lowenschuss, also held that a nondebtor
release within a Chapter 11 debtor’s reorganization plan was impermissible because the bankruptcy court lacks the power to confirm
plans that do not comply with the Bankruptcy Code under
§ 1129(a)(1).31 The Ninth Circuit relied on the language in § 524(e)
that specifically discharges debtors and looked to the circuit court’s
24. In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592, 594 (10th Cir. 1990), modified sub nom.
Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1991). The state statute involved recognizes the concurrent
liability of the nonpaying client under common law and the settling adverse party. Id. at 598.
25. Id. at 598-99.
26. Id. at 599, 600.
27. Id. at 600.
28. Id.; see also In re Bracy, 449 F. Supp. 70, 71 (D. Mont. 1978) (“[I]t is the policy of the law
to discharge the bankrupt but not to release from liability those who are liable with him.”).
29. In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d at 601 (citing Norwest Bank Worthington v.
Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)) (“[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy
courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
30. Id. at 601-02.
31. Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995).
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past holding in In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc., albeit under different facts,
that “§ 524(e) precludes bankruptcy courts from discharging the liabilities of non-debtors.”32
Following these circuits’ decisions, the First Circuit in Monarch Life
Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray upheld a nondebtor release but mainly because the creditor opposed to the release “failed to object to the confirmation order and/or appeal from the section 105(a) injunctive
provision included in it.”33 The court determined that the ambiguity
of § 105(a)’s broad powers was litigated within the bankruptcy proceeding, and without an objection, the creditor’s claims of compensatory damages against the nondebtor for alleged concealment of
financial information was barred.34
2.

In re Munford, Inc.

In 1996, the Eleventh Circuit decided In re Munford, Inc., a case
involving an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court by a debtor in
possession, Munford, Inc., seeking monetary damages for a total of
$60 million and other remedies as a result of a leveraged buyout in
1988 that allegedly forced it into bankruptcy.35 Of the many defendants, Valuation Research Corporation (VRC), a valuation and consulting firm, denied liability but offered to settle claims against it for
$350,000 of its $400,000 liability insurance policy, leaving $50,000 for
attorney’s fees.36 The settlement was conditioned, however, upon the
bankruptcy court issuing a protective order that permanently enjoined
the “nonsettling” defendants from pursuing contribution or indemnification claims against VRC.37 After Munford agreed and the proposed
settlement was submitted for approval under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019(a), the bankruptcy court “found that the insurance policy represented VRC’s only substantial asset,” approved the
settlement, and “enjoin[ed] the nonsettling defendants from asserting
contribution and indemnification claims against VRC pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16.”38 On appeal, the district court affirmed.39
Reviewing the bankruptcy court’s decision, the Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that § 105(a) permits the bankruptcy court to enter “any or32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995).
Id. at 976, 983.
Munford v. Munford (In re Munford, Inc.), 97 F.3d 449, 452 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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der necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code” and Rule 16 permits “use of special procedures to assist
the parties in reaching a settlement.”40 Taken together, the court reasoned, they “provide ample authority for the bankruptcy[ ] court[‘s]
action.”41 The court concluded that nondebtor releases were issuable
“where the settling defendant provided funds for the bankruptcy estate, but would not have entered into the settlement in the absence of
such bar order, and where the bankruptcy court found that the bar
order was fair and equitable.”42 Three additional reasons given by the
court in support of its decision include: (1) public policy favors pretrial
settlement, (2) litigation costs burden a bankrupt estate, and (3) bar
orders play an integral part in facilitating settlement.43
3.

Post-Munford Case Law Development

From 2000 to 2011, the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits all ruled in favor of bankruptcy courts having the authority to
issue nondebtor releases within debtor reorganization plans.44 Most
notable and unique are the approaches taken by the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits. In re Dow Corning Corp. was a 2002 Sixth Circuit case in
which the court held that bankruptcy courts could issue nondebtor releases because § 105(a) was a statutory grant of power that did not
confine the bankruptcy court to traditional equity jurisprudence.45
The court relied on two Supreme Court cases: Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc. and United States v. First National City Bank.46 In Grupo Mexicano, the Court “vacated an injunction preventing a toll road operator from dissipating, transferring, or
encumbering its only assets to the prejudice of an unsecured note
holder because traditional equity jurisprudence [under the Judiciary
Act of 1789] did not allow such remedies until a debt had been estab40. Id. at 455 (internal quotations omitted).
41. In re Munford, Inc., 97 F.3d at 455.
42. SE Prop. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside Eng’g &
Surveying, Inc.), 780 F.3d 1070, 1078 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Vision-Park Properties, L.L.C. v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, L.L.C., 136 S. Ct. 109 (2015) (citing In re Munford,
Inc., 97 F.3d at 455).
43. In re Munford, Inc., 97 F.3d at 455.
44. See Behrmann v. Nat’l Heritage Found., Inc., 663 F.3d 704 (4th Cir. 2011); In re Ingersoll,
Inc., 562 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009); Airadigm Commc’ns., Inc. v. FCC (In re Airadigm Commc’ns.,
Inc.), 519 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2008); Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch v. Metromedia Fiber
Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2005); Class Five
Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002);
Gillman v. Cont’l Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 205 (3d Cir. 2000).
45. In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658.
46. Id. at 657-58; Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308
(1999); United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
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lished.”47 Grupo Mexicano, however, distinguished its holding from
First National where the Court approved an injunction against a thirdparty bank concerning a taxpayer’s assets because the case “involved
not the Court’s general equitable powers under the Judiciary Act of
1789, but its powers under the statute authorizing tax injunctions.”48
Since In re Dow Corning Corp. involved an injunction issued pursuant
to a statutory provision of the Bankruptcy Code, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the bankruptcy court was not confined to traditional equity
jurisprudence.49
The court then identified seven factors to be evaluated when determining whether a nondebtor release is permitted in an “unusual
circumstance:”
(1) There is an identity of interests between the debtor and the third
party, usually an Indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the
non-debtor is, in essence, a suit against the debtor or will deplete
the assets of the estate; (2) The non-debtor has contributed substantial assets to the reorganization; (3) The injunction is essential to
reorganization, namely, the reorganization hinges on the debtor being free from indirect suits against parties who would have indemnity or contribution claims against the debtor; (4) The impacted
class, or classes, has overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan; (5)
The plan provides a mechanism to pay for all, or substantially all, of
the class or classes affected by the injunction; (6) The plan provides
an opportunity for those claimants who choose not to settle to recover in full and; (7) The bankruptcy court made a record of specific
factual findings that support its conclusions.50

In 2011, the Fourth Circuit, in Behrmann v. Nat’l Heritage Found.,
Inc., looked to its earlier ruling in In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., which
reiterated the Fifth Circuit’s statement that “[a]lthough section 524
has generally been interpreted to preclude release of guarantors by a
bankruptcy court, the statute does not by its specific words preclude
the discharge of a guaranty when it has been accepted and confirmed
as an integral part of reorganization.”51 The A.H. Robins court understood this to mean that the section should not be literally applied in
every circumstance to limit the power of bankruptcy courts.52 To ensure that the case constituted an unusual circumstance, the Fourth Cir47. In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657 (citing Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 318-19).
48. Id. (quoting Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 326) (internal quotations omitted).
49. Id. at 658.
50. In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658; see also George W. Kuney, “All Writs” in
Bankruptcy and District Courts: A Story of Differing Scope, 34 REV. LITIG. 255, 267 (2015).
51. Behrmann v. Nat’l Heritage Found., Inc., 663 F.3d 704, 710 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing MenardSanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Republic
Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1987))).
52. Id.
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cuit held that the Sixth Circuit’s seven factors should be considered or
the following four-factor test in In re Railworks Corp.:
(1) overwhelming approval for the plan; (2) a close connection between the causes of action against the third party and the causes of
action against the debtor; (3) that the injunction is essential to the
reorganization; and (4) that the plan of reorganization provides for
payment of substantially all of the claims affected by the
injunction.53

Ironically just two years before the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the
Fifth Circuit found nondebtor releases impermissible in In re Pac.
Lumber Co.54 The court found “little equit[y] about protecting the
released non-debtors from negligence suits arising out of the reorganization.”55 The court reiterated its past holdings that § 524(e) only releases the debtor, not co-liable third parties, and held that “[t]hese
cases seem broadly to foreclose non-consensual non-debtor releases
and permanent injunctions.”56
3.

In re Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc.

In 2015, the Eleventh Circuit revisited the issue of whether bankruptcy courts had the authority to issue nondebtor releases under the
Bankruptcy Code in In re Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc.57
This case involved a civil engineering and surveying firm, Seaside,
whose five principal shareholders started two companies for the purpose of real estate investments.58 The companies, with personal guaranties from the principals, borrowed money from SE Property
Holdings, LLC and affiliated entity Vision–Park Properties, LLC,
(collectively, “Vision”).59 The companies defaulted and Vision sought
to recover under the guaranties in a filed suit.60 Three of the principals filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection, and Vision won the
Seaside shares of one of the principals at an auction by a Chapter 7
53. Id. at 712 (citing Hoge v. Moore (In re Railworks Corp.), 345 B.R. 529, 536 (Bankr. D.
Md. 2006)).
54. Bank of N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584
F.3d 229, 252 (5th Cir. 2009).
55. Id.
56. Id.; see also Ad Hoc Grp. of Vitro Noteholders v. Vitro SAB De CV (In re Vitro SAB De
CV), 701 F.3d 1031, 1061 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 252) (“This
conclusion was consistent with prior rulings from this circuit that ‘seem broadly to foreclose nonconsensual non-debtor releases and permanent injunctions.’ ”).
57. See generally SE Prop. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside
Eng’g & Surveying, Inc.), 780 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Vision-Park
Properties, L.L.C. v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, L.L.C., 136 S. Ct. 109 (2015).
58. Id. at 1074.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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trustee.61 Soon after, Seaside filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and
“proposed to reorganize and continue operations as the entity Gulf
Atlantic, LLC,” a company managed by the three bankrupt principals.62 Under the plan, outside equity holders, like Vision, would not
gain interest in Gulf but exchange their interests in Seaside for promissory notes with a 4.25% interest rate.63 Additionally, the reorganization plan included the following releases of nondebtors that the
bankruptcy court confirmed over the objection of Vision:
[N]one of the Debtor, . . . Reorganized Debtor, Gulf Atlantic . . .
(and any officer or directors or members of the aforementioned [entities]) and any of their respective Representatives (the
“Releasees”) shall have or incur any liability to any Holder of a
Claim against or Interest in Debtor, or any other party-in-interest
. . . for any act, omission, transaction or other occurrence in connection with, relating to, or arising out of the Chapter 11 Case, the pursuit of confirmation of the Amended Plan as modified by the
Technical Amendment, or the consummation of the Amended Plan
as modified by this Technical Amendment, except and solely to the
extent such liability is based on fraud, gross negligence or willful
misconduct.64

In response to Vision’s objection on appeal to the bankruptcy
court’s issuance of these nondebtor releases, the Eleventh Circuit began by stating that the previous holding in Munford was controlling
and stood for the proposition that the Eleventh Circuit permitted
nondebtor releases under some circumstances.65 Noting that the facts
in Munford were different and concerned a settlement context while
the present Seaside case concerned “claims against non-debtors that
would undermine the operations of, and doom the possibility of success for, the reorganized entity,” the circuit court looked to sister circuit decisions for guidance.66
After broadly reviewing the other circuits’ precedents, the Eleventh
Circuit disagreed with and addressed the minority circuits’ reasonings
that § 524(e) “foreclose[d] non-consensual non-debtor releases in permanent injunctions.”67 The court sided with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in In re Airadigm Communications, Inc. stating that while
the “‘discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of
another entity on . . . such debt’, . . . § 524(e) says nothing about the
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 1074-75.
Id. at 1075.
In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc., 780 F.3d at 1075.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1076-77.
Id.
Id. at 1077.
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authority of the bankruptcy court to release a non-debtor from a creditor’s claims.”68 The court noted that Congress would have limited the
powers of the bankruptcy courts if it desired to do so in a clear manner as it has done in other instances of the Code.69 The Eleventh Circuit also agreed that such “bar orders” should not be issued “lightly,”
and applied the Sixth Circuit’s seven-factor test to ensure such injunctive orders would be issued only in unusual circumstances “in which
such an order is necessary for the success of the reorganization, and
only in situations in which such an order is fair and equitable under all
the facts and circumstances.”70
The Eleventh Circuit found that Seaside satisfied all of these factors:
(1) further voluminous litigation would deplete the assets of Gulf, and
released former principals of Seaside as key employees of the reorganized entity would expend their time in litigation instead of focusing
on the reorganized entity; (2) the released principals’ services are the
very “life blood of the reorganized debtor” and constitute contributed
substantial assets; (3) litigation would likely continue without a bar
order and doom a successful reorganization; (4) all creditors, except
Vision (and two trustees), voted in favor of the plan; (5) Vision would
be paid in full for its Seaside shares; (6) Vision would get full value of
its equity interest in the debtor and its identification of any other
claims was considered vague; and (7) the bankruptcy court’s extensive
findings were “amply supported by the evidence.”71 Furthermore, the
court found that fairness and equity existed in the additional requirements that the debtor cease pursuing its claims for sanctions against
Vision and the release narrowly bar claims arising out of the Chapter
11 case and not fraud, gross negligence, or willful misconduct.72
II.

ANALYSIS

This part of the Article will analyze the Eleventh Circuit’s approach
and holding in Seaside within the context of the different approaches
and holdings reached by the majority and minority of circuit courts on
the question of authority to issue nondebtor releases under the Bankruptcy Code.
68. Id. at 1078; Airadigm Commc’ns., Inc. v. FCC (In re Airadigm Commc’ns., Inc.), 519 F.3d
640, 656 (7th Cir. 2008).
69. In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc., 780 F.3d at 1078.
70. Id. at 1078-79.
71. Id. at 1079-81.
72. Id. at 1081.
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What the Eleventh Circuit Got Right

The Seventh Circuit’s Statutory Analysis of § 524(e)
Was Reasonable.

The Eleventh Circuit reasonably relied on the Seventh Circuit’s
statutory analysis of § 524(e) in determining that the section did not
foreclose nonconsensual nondebtor releases. Other than a plain reading of the section suggesting so, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning that
Congress did not intend to limit bankruptcy courts’ powers in this
manner was supported by inferable legislative intent.73 First, a previous version of § 524(e) that was repealed in 1979 contained the language that “liability of a person who is a co-debtor with, or guarantor
or in any manner a surety for, a bankrupt shall not be altered by the
discharge.”74 However, the current language after the amendment
omits “shall” and states that “discharge of a debt of the debtor does
not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any
other entity for, such debt.”75 The purposeful removal, and not simply
the absence of, “shall” from the section by Congress strongly suggests
that it did not intend to limit the equitable power of bankruptcy courts
to order that a discharge affect the liability of a third-party.76
Second, Congress affirmatively limits the powers of bankruptcy
courts elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code.77 For example, § 105(b)
states that the “a court may not appoint a receiver in a case under this
title” and § 1129(a) sets out requirements for plan confirmation.78
Congress, if it desired to limit the equitable power of bankruptcy
courts to release nondebtors from creditors’ claims, would have likely
stated this clearly or at least included some form of anti-third party
release requirement in the already established list of requirements for
plan confirmation under § 1129(a).
2.

The Eleventh Circuit Bypassed the Fourth and Fifth Circuits’
Poor Reliances and Unsound Reasonings.

The Eleventh Circuit, rightly so, did not “hang its hat” on many of
the other circuits’ analyses for permitting or prohibiting nondebtor releases. Some of these circuits’ arguments appear to be supported by
misplaced reliance on other courts’ jurisprudences that contain distin73. See In re Airadigm Commc’ns., Inc., 519 F.3d at 656.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012).
76. In re Airadigm Commc’ns., Inc., 519 F.3d at 656.
77. Id.
78. Id. (discussing bankruptcy courts’ limitations established by Congress); 11 U.S.C. § 105(b);
see 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)-(16).
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guishable facts. For example, although the Eleventh Circuit agrees
with the Fourth Circuit’s use of the Sixth Circuit’s extensive sevenfactor test to establish an “unusual circumstance” in which a
nondebtor release should be issued, the Eleventh Circuit noticeably
does not rely on the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning for whether bankruptcy courts have authority to issue these releases.79 This is likely
because the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning is ironically based on a case,
Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, from the Fifth Circuit.80 This reliance
by the Fourth Circuit is misguided for two reasons: (1) Republic Supply Co. contained distinguishable facts in comparison to the Fourth
Circuit case, In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., and (2) the Fifth Circuit had
already ruled against nondebtor releases of this type two years prior in
In re Pac. Lumber Co.81
The Fifth Circuit in Republic Supply Co. held that “[a]lthough section 524 has generally been interpreted to preclude release of guarantors by a bankruptcy court, the statute does not by its specific words
preclude the discharge of a guaranty when it has been accepted and
confirmed as an integral part of reorganization.”82 “Accepted and
confirmed” means that the creditor neither objected, nor appealed,
the confirmation by the bankruptcy court—this is not a decision on
the authority of the bankruptcy court to issue nondebtor releases but
a ruling in favor of res judicata preventing a creditor from seeking
claims after essentially waiving the claims.83 The debtor in In re A.H.
Robins Co., Inc., however, had objected. The Fourth Circuit used
poorly reasoned its decision.84
79. See generally SE Prop. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside
Eng’g & Surveying, Inc.), 780 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Vision-Park
Properties, L.L.C. v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, L.L.C., 136 S. Ct. 109 (2015).
80. Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989)
(“the Fifth Circuit has stated that ‘[a]lthough section 524 has generally been interpreted to preclude release of guarantors by a bankruptcy court, the statute does not by its specific words
preclude the discharge of a guaranty when it has been accepted and confirmed as an integral part
of reorganization.’ ”).
81. See Bank of N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.),
584 F.3d 229, 252-53 (5th Cir. 2009).
82. In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d at 702 (emphasis added); Behrmann v. Nat’l Heritage
Found., 663 F.3d 704, 712 (4th Cir. 2011).
83. Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1047 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Republic neither objected to that provision of the Plan nor appealed its confirmation. . . . Shoaf raised the defense of
res judicata in this suit that seeks to collect on the guaranty.”); In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at
252 n.27 (Republic Supply Co. “concern[s] the res judicata effect of non-debtor releases, not their
legality.”).
84. In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d at 697 (“Robins objected to all the Dalkon Shield
Claims.”).
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The Fourth Circuit further reasoned that § 524(e) did not limit the
equitable power of the bankruptcy court “where the entire reorganization hinges on the debtor being free from indirect claims such as
suits against parties who would have indemnity or contribution claims
against the debtor.”85 This reasoning is also flawed because discharge
of debt of the debtor already prevents the commencement of any action to collect any debt from the debtor relating to claims discharged
in bankruptcy, including the commencement of actions to collect
under indemnity provisions.86
Another example is the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on a past Eleventh
Circuit case, In re Jet Florida Sys., Inc., “as being consistent with the
minority view that non-consensual, non-debtor releases were prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 524(e).”87 The Eleventh Circuit addressed this inappropriate reliance in Seaside and distinguished Jet Florida as a case
that concerned a tort claimant, post-discharge of the debtor, seeking
to establish the liability of the debtor in order to obtain recovery
against the debtor’s insurer, not the debtor.88 The Eleventh Circuit
simply held that this was possible because § 524(a)’s “injunction was
designed primarily to protect the debtor and the bankruptcy estate . . .
[not] to enjoin a creditor from taking action against another who also
might be liable to the creditor.”89 Jet Florida simply did not involve a
nondebtor release, and the claim at issue did not ultimately seek monetary judgment against the debtor or a reorganized entity of the
debtor. The Fifth Circuit’s reliance was misplaced.
B. What the Eleventh Circuit Got Wrong
1. The Eleventh Circuit’s Statutory Analysis of § 105(a) Results in
an Injunction That Is Overreaching and Under-inclusive.
A plain reading of § 105(a) supports the argument that permanent
nondebtor releases that only allow creditors to pursue claims of “lia85. Id. at 702.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2012) (discharge “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action . . . to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal
liability of the debtor”); see also In re W. Real Estate Fund Inc., 922 F.2d 592, 602 (10th Cir.
1990), modified sub nom. Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1991) (“the discharge injunction
provided for in section 524(a) already frees the debtor from potential derivative claims, such as
indemnification or subrogation, that might arise from the creditor’s post-confirmation attempts
to recover the discharged debt from others.”).
87. SE Prop. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside Eng’g &
Surveying, Inc.), 780 F.3d 1070, 1077 n.4 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Vision-Park
Properties, L.L.C. v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, L.L.C., 136 S. Ct. 109 (2015); see Owaski v. Jet
Florida Sys., Inc. (In re Jet Florida Sys., Inc.), 883 F.2d 970 (11th Cir. 1989).
88. In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc., 780 F.3d at 1077 n.4.
89. In re Jet Florida Sys., Inc., 883 F.2d at 973.
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bility . . . based on fraud, gross negligence or willful misconduct” violate the boundaries of § 105(a) and are under-inclusive in the type of
liability claims that creditors should be enjoined from pursuing.90 Section 105(a) states that “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
this title.”91 The question should then become: what provision of the
title does the bankruptcy court seek to carry out, and is the proposed
action necessary and appropriate as a means to that end? Seaside involved a Chapter 11 confirmation of a plan of reorganization under
§ 1129, and the Eleventh Circuit stated that it applied the Sixth Circuit’s seven-factor test to ensure that “such bar orders . . . be reserved
for those unusual cases in which such an order is necessary for the
success of the reorganization.”92
Thus, the question, once contextualized, becomes: “Are permanent
nondebtor releases that only allow creditors to pursue claims of liability based on fraud, gross negligence or willful misconduct ‘necessary
or appropriate’ for successful reorganization?” The answer in regard
to necessity and appropriateness is “no.” A temporary injunctive relief would be appropriate to achieve this end and be less severe than a
permanent injunctive release of creditors’ claims. The Eleventh Circuit noted the fear that nondebtors “would expend their time in defense of litigation as opposed to focusing on their professional duties
for the reorganized entity.”93 Reorganization plans are not in place
forever; they end upon successful repayment of debt. Thus,
nondebtors should be able to defend against litigation and without
being preoccupied with contributing to the success of the reorganization plan after its completion. In fact, a debtor’s own discharge is conditioned upon the successful completion of the reorganization plan.94
If the plan is not completed, the debtor does not receive a discharge.
Here, the court is effectively issuing a permanent discharge to
nondebtors on claims without any condition at all. This is better treatment than even a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code who is presumably supposed to be the primary benefactor. A permanent injunction is
not necessary. Considering that the court is completely barring creditors’ claims against nondebtors without condition, it is not appropriate
either.
90. In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc., 780 F.3d at 1076.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (emphasis added).
92. See In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc., 780 F.3d at 1078.
93. Id. at 1080.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(A) (“confirmation of the plan does not discharge any debt provided for in the plan until the court grants a discharge on completion of all payments under the
plan”).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\15-2\DPB201.txt

122

unknown

Seq: 16

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

19-JUN-17

13:05

[Vol. 15:107

Possibly to balance the inequitable action of barring creditors’
claims forever, the Eleventh Circuit makes an exception for claims of
fraud, gross negligence and willful misconduct without giving a meaningful reason of necessity or appropriateness. If the purpose is to
make sure reorganization is successful, why only bar negligence-like
claims? Maybe the court reasoned, as a policy matter, that barring
claims of willful misconduct was too drastic just to ensure the success
of reorganization. Regardless, the court does not state a meaningful
reason. Without making the case for why such an exception is necessary or appropriate to ensure the success of reorganization, the authority to carve out the exception falls outside the scope of § 105(a).
It is notable that claims against members of the creditors’ committee receive different treatment since courts interpret § 1103 to give the
committee qualified immunity.95
2.

Seaside Did Not Satisfy the Seven-Factor Test for
an Unusual Circumstance.

The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of and justification that Seaside satisfied the seven-factor test is questionable at best. Practitioners have
criticized the court’s analysis under the factors as flawed.96 For the
first and third factor, the court found that continued litigation could
deplete the assets of Gulf; however, Vision’s claims against the released Seaside principals would be based on their individual liability
for their individual actions and would not lead to liability for Gulf
Atlantic.97 Under the second factor, the finding that the released Seaside principals were contributing substantial assets to the reorganization in the form of labor as engineers and surveyors is absurd. The
principals did not contribute anything of value to the reorganization.
If anything, their contribution was a promise of future labor, that
could be later abandoned, for which they would already be compensated with salaries and benefits.98 Their labor was not being given in
exchange for a release.
For the fourth factor, practitioners also noted that the impacted
Class 5, which included Vision, voted to reject the plan.99 Under the
fifth and sixth factors, Vision’s claims that might be released under the
95. Bank of N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584
F.3d 229, 253 (5th Cir. 2009) (courts that have held that 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c), which lists the
creditors’ committee’s powers, implies committee members have qualified immunity for actions
within the scope of their duties.).
96. Anderson & Basham, supra note 5, at 21.
97. Id at 20-21.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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plan were rejected by the bankruptcy court and no mechanism was
provided for Vision to “opt out.”100 Further noted by practitioners
concerning the realistic justification given by the court for factor
seven’s requirement of thorough findings to support the court’s conclusion, “Seaside apparently managed to operate at a profit” even
while handling the litigious “wrangling with Vision pre- and post-petition.”101 It is doubtful that the releases were actually necessary in fear
that “Vision might distract the principals of Gulf Atlantic and cause a
deterioration of the Gulf Atlantic business, thus jeopardizing the success of the plan.”102 Seaside does not appear to have met the requirements of an “unusual case” such that extraordinary relief of
nondebtor releases were permitted.
III. PROPOSAL
This part of the Article, in light of the previous section’s analysis of
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision and the various circuits’ approaches
and decisions, proposes that the United States Supreme Court apply
the following approaches, tests, and reasoning in future cases of
nondebtor releases.
A.

Adopt the Seventh Circuit’s Reasoning and the Sixth Circuit’s
Seven-Factor Test.

The Supreme Court should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s rationale for
why bankruptcy courts can issue nondebtor releases and the Sixth Circuit’s seven-factor test to determine appropriate circumstances in
which such releases can be granted. Of all the circuit courts’ justifications for or against bankruptcy courts having authority to issue nonconsensual nondebtor releases during a plan confirmation, the
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is most sound. The court takes a plain
reading approach, which focuses on § 524(e)’s language concerning
discharge of a debtor. The section simply states that discharge of a
debtor’s debt does not affect co-liable third parties from being liable
for the debt. It says nothing about the authority of the bankruptcy
court to release a non-debtor from a creditor’s claims to effectuate
successful reorganization. The Seventh Circuit also hinges its position
on inferable congressional intent. If Congress meant to limit the
power of bankruptcy courts to issues these types of releases, the words
“shall not” in a past version of § 524(e) or another mandatory term
100. Id at 21.
101. Id.
102. Anderson & Basham, supra note 5, at 21.
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like “must not” would have been left or added respectively to ensure
that discharge of the debt of a debtor did not release a third party
from liability.
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit’s seven-factor test provides more
protection for impacted creditors and limits the circumstances to
mandatory and rare instances in which releases would be granted.
Unlike the four-factor test recognized by the Fourth Circuit, which
only requires an overwhelming approval of the reorganization plan,
the seven-factor test requires that the impacted class or classes has
overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan.103 This is important because
these parties, and not all parties to the bankruptcy, are the entities
that will lose their rights to bring valid claims against nondebtors.
Also, the seven-factor test requires the bankruptcy court make a record of specific factual findings that support its conclusions. This requirement should limit the issuances of releases to rare circumstances
where facts support the courts’ findings under each factor of the test.
B.

Do Not Adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s Reasoning Under the
Seven-Factor Test.

The Supreme Court should heavily emphasize making a record of
specific factual findings that support conclusions under the seven-factor test and denounce the conclusive findings under the test by the
Eleventh Circuit in Seaside. The Eleventh Circuit stressed repeatedly
the care that should be taken in issuing of nondebtor releases only in
necessary circumstances:
such bar orders ought not to be issued lightly, and should be reserved for those unusual cases in which such an order is necessary
for the success of the reorganization, and only in situations in which
such an order is fair and equitable under all the facts and circumstances. . . . [and] should be used “cautiously and infrequently.”104

Yet, the Eleventh Circuit permitted the bankruptcy court’s issuance
of a release under unnecessary and inappropriate circumstances, as
previously discussed.105 Making sure that the record actually supports
the unusual circumstance guards against nondebtors using Seaside as
an excuse to be released from liability post-confirmation.
103. Behrmann v. Nat’l Heritage Found., Inc., 663 F.3d 704, 712 (4th Cir. 2011); Hoge v.
Moore (In re Railworks Corp.), 345 B.R. 529, 536 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006).
104. SE Prop. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside Eng’g &
Surveying, Inc.), 780 F.3d 1070, 1078-79 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Vision-Park
Properties, L.L.C. v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, L.L.C., 136 S. Ct. 109 (2015).
105. See supra Part II.B.2.
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Make Nondebtor Releases Temporary and Inclusive of All
Claims Against Nondebtors.

Last, the Supreme Court should limit nondebtor releases temporally and expand the scope of liability claims enjoined under the release. A temporary injunction until the completion of the
reorganization plan upon final repayment of debt or at such time
before when the nondebtor can defend against liability claims without
dashing the hopes of successful reorganization is sufficiently within
the boundaries of § 105(a)’s grant of equitable powers to the bankruptcy court. The Eleventh Circuit highlighted the purpose of the release is to protect the success of the reorganized entity’s rehabilitative
process after plan confirmation.106 The nondebtor releases were to
enjoin “claims against non-debtors that would undermine the operations of, and doom the possibility of success for, the reorganized entity.”107 A permanent release of nondebtors from liability is not
necessary to achieve this goal. The injunction need only be
temporary.
The solution of issuing a temporary injunction is supported by the
fact that bankruptcy courts already issue temporary injunctions in the
form of a stay to permit debtor companies to come up with a plan of
reorganization. Additionally, the Supreme Court’s holding in First
National, a case relied on by the Sixth Circuit in holding that
nondebtor releases are permitted because actions done pursuant to a
statutory provision are not confined to traditional equity jurisprudence, only recognizes the equitable use of temporary injunctions.108
Beyond the fact that First National is not controlling for cases involving permanent nondebtor releases because it only involved a temporary injunction, a permanent injunction on valid claims against a
nondebtor that has not filed bankruptcy does not seem equitable.
If the Supreme Court adopts this proposal that temporary injunctions should be issued, the Fifth Circuit in In re A.H. Robins Co. Inc.
calms any concerns that the statute of limitations on enjoined claims
will expire: “seeking the protection of the court under the bankruptcy
laws, [debtor] implicitly waives its right to claim that this stay does not
toll the state statutes of limitations. Our system of law universally
frowns on a party who would use the stay as both a sword and a
106. See In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc., 780 F.3d at 107.
107. Id.
108. United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 380, 384-85 (1965) (“The District
Court, on the basis of the affidavits, issued a temporary injunction enjoining respondent from
transferring any property or rights to property.”); see also Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow
Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 656-57 (6th Cir. 2002).
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shield.”109 Albeit the nondebtor has not filed for or subjected itself to
the bankruptcy process, the same implicit waiver should be true for a
nondebtor because it seeks the temporary protection of the bankruptcy court from liability via the temporary injunctive release.
CONCLUSION
Since the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeal’s controversial ruling on nondebtor releases in 1986 in In re AOV Indus. Inc,
Courts of Appeals have used various approaches and arrived at splitting decisions on bankruptcy court authority and appropriate circumstances for such releases. Based on this Article’s analysis of the
Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in Seaside within the context of the
different approaches and holdings reached by the circuit courts, the
United States Supreme Court should adopt a plain reading of § 105(a)
that permits bankruptcy courts to issue temporary nonconsensual
nondebtor releases. More specifically, the Court should adopt the
Seventh Circuit’s approach in reasoning why bankruptcy courts have
equitable authority to issue nondebtor releases, adopt the Sixth Circuit’s seven-factor test to ensure such releases are only issued within
the boundaries of the Bankruptcy Code, and make nondebtor releases
temporary and inclusive of all claims against nondebtors. By addressing this issue, the Supreme Court will resolve a multi-circuit split and
prevent creditors’ claims from being permanently barred while still
providing protection to the debtor’s reorganization process.

109. Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co. Inc.), 828 F.2d 1023, 1026 (4th Cir.
1987).

